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 TRADE REFORM AND MANUFACTURING PRICING BEHAVIOUR IN 
 
 FOUR ARCHETYPE WESTERN PACIFIC ECONOMIES* 
 
 
Abstract 
 General equilibrium models are constructed of four Western Pacific economies which 
differ according to their levels of development and the comparative sizes of their manufacturing 
sectors.  The countries chosen are Australia, an industrialised importer of manufactures, Japan, 
an industrialised exporter, the Philippines, a developing importer, and the Republic of Korea, a 
developing exporter.  In each case the manufacturing sector is characterised as comprising nine 
separate industries, each with identical oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous goods which 
are differentiated from competing imports.  Trade reforms are found to yield conventional 
results in that net economic gains are small while implicit transfers are substantial.  More 
competitive (non-collusive) pricing by oligopolistic firms, which might be achieved through 
reform of competition law and trade practices surveillance, yield larger net gains and these gains 
tend to accrue to all domestic primary factors.  Imperfect competition and differences in 
economic structure are found to interact most strongly when reforms include changes to 
competition policy and hence to the pricing behaviour of oligopoly firms. 
 
Introduction 
 From the mid 1980s, governments in most industrial economies cast about more 
zealously than before in search of sources of renewed internal growth.  The impetus for this was 
a pervasive trend toward higher unemployment since the early 1970s.  In developing countries, 
on the other hand, the debt crisis of the early 1980s exposed their governments to increased 
external pressure to improve aggregate productivity.  This, combined with the demonstration 
effect of better growth performance in the comparatively open, comparatively undistorted Asian 
developing economies, led to growth-oriented reforms throughout the developing world.  
Common elements in the reforms in both industrial and developing economies were trade 
liberalisation (the removal of exchange controls and non-tariff barriers, combined with 
commitments to reduce tariff levels) and competition-enhancing changes to policies governing 
the behaviour of domestic firms.  In Australia, both elements come under the general rubric 
"microeconomic reform". 
 This paper examines the effects of two such reforms in the context of the late 1980s.  
These are the removal of trade barriers and more competitive (indeed non-collusive) pricing 
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behaviour by manufacturing firms, the latter being achieved through improvements in 
competition law and trade practices surveillance.  To aid the comparison of their respective 
effects, both policy reforms are examined in the context of a general equilibrium model which 
incorporates imperfectly competitive behaviour in manufacturing in the manner of Harris 
(1984).  And the generality of the results obtained is enhanced by fitting the model to four 
differently structured yet archetypal Western Pacific economies of the late 1980s.  The countries 
chosen are Australia, an industrialised importer of manufactures, Japan, an industrialised 
exporter, the Philippines, a developing importer, and the Republic of Korea, a developing 
exporter. 
 In Part 2 a brief description of the model is provided.  Part 3 then discusses the structure 
of the four economies and the behavioural implications of the model's characterisation of their 
manufacturing sectors.  Part 4 presents the results from trade reform experiments and Part 5 the 
results from pricing behaviour reform. 
 
2. The Model 
 To keep the model manageable, its structure has been made simpler than many modern 
computable general equilibrium models.1  While a complete mathematical description is given 
in the Appendix, a broad summary follows.  Institutions, including government, are represented 
by a single consuming household with Cobb-Douglas preferences among types of goods and 
CES subaggregation of home goods with imports.  Firms in all 12 sectors are oligopolistic in 
their product pricing behaviour, each holding calibrated conjectural variations.  Each also bears 
fixed capital and skilled labour costs, enabling the representation of unrealised economies of 
scale.  But home products in each sector are homogeneous and output is Cobb-Douglas in 
variable factors and intermediate inputs.  The latter are Cobb-Douglas subaggregates of home 
and imported products.2  The existence of oligopoly power in product markets notwithstanding, 
                                                 
1 The model is a substantially revised and extended version of that used by Gunasekera and Tyers (1990), which 
was modelled, in turn, after Harris (1984) and Horridge (1987). 
2 Since the elasticities of substitution between home goods and imports in final demand are generally greater than 
  
 
 4
firms are price takers in the markets for both primary factors and intermediate inputs. 
 The five primary factors are capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour, arable land and 
mineral/energy resources.  In the length of run assumed, capital is homogeneous and fully 
mobile internationally while the domestic endowments of the other factors are fixed.  Land and 
mineral resources are sector-specific in all lengths of run.  Domestically-owned capital is fixed 
in quantity, so that changes in the domestic capital stock affect the level of income repatriated 
abroad and hence they have implications for the balance of payments.  But, depending on the 
closure chosen, firms need not earn market returns on capital in this model.  If, for example, 
entry and exit of firms are prohibited (or even if they are costly) then economic profits or losses 
occur. 
 Following Harris (1984), the economy modelled is "almost small".  It has no power to 
influence the border prices of its imports but its exports are differentiated from competing 
products abroad and hence face finite-elastic demand.  An exchange rate is defined and its value 
set to retain any gap in the current account of the balance of payments evident from the model 
database.  Devaluations which retain this degree of imbalance raise the relative cost of imports 
in the home market and lower the prices of exports relative to competing goods in foreign 
markets.  The numeraire used is a Cobb-Douglas index of composite (home product and import) 
prices, derived from the single household's expenditure function.  Databases for all four 
countries are detailed by Tyers et al. (2004). 
 The model is solved using two "Walrasian adjustment" algorithms.  If firm entry and exit 
are prohibited, corresponding to the "short run" closure of Harris (1984), the exchange rate and 
the prices of the four factors which are not internationally mobile are adjusted to remove any 
excess payments imbalance and to achieve the appropriate degree of factor market clearance.  If 
firm entry and exit are permitted, this solution is embedded in a second iterative process which 
adjusts the numbers of firms in each sector until incentives for entry and exit no longer exist. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
unity, this implies, reasonably, that products are less substitutable as intermediate inputs than in final demand. 
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3. Economic Structure and Behaviour 
 The databases assembled are made up, principally, of four social accounting matrices 
(SAMs).  For Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Korea the years selected are 1986, 1985, 
1983, 1985, respectively.  The nearest available database for the Philippines corresponds to 
1983, which was a year of comparatively poor performance associated with the collapse of the 
Marcos regime.  For the other three countries departures from trend are associated with the 
extraordinary boom period of the 1980s.  As a consequence, the pure profits observed, 
particularly in Australia and Japan, are probably higher than the manufacturing sector could 
expect to maintain in normal years, while net losses observed in the Philippines are also 
atypical.  These extraordinary profits and losses have comparatively little influence on the 
reform experiments, except in the case of the Philippines, where the losses of 1983 are 
occasionally so large as to threaten the accuracy with which the pricing behaviour in some of its 
manufacturing industries is calibrated. 
 The size and sectoral structure of the four economies is suggested by Table 1.  There are 
obvious disparities in overall size.  In the late 1980s Japan had more than twice the population 
of the next most populous country and its economy was healthy: it had about ten times the 
output of the next most wealthy country, measured at market exchange rates.  Nevertheless, the 
desired contrast between the two developed and the two developing economies is evident.  The 
GDP per capita of the former was more than double that of the latter, even when the 
International Comparison Program (ICP) measure is used.  Moreover, the service sector was 
comparatively large in both the developed economies, while agriculture remained a substantial 
contributor to GDP in both the developing economies. 
 The manufacturing sector still contributed more than a quarter of total GDP in Japan and 
the developing countries.  Where the roles of manufacturing are contrasted is in the balance of 
payments, which is depicted in Table 2.  In both Australia and the Philippines, about nine per 
cent of GDP was spent on net imports of manufactures.  In Japan and Korea, on the other hand, 
net manufacturing exports amounted to eight and five per cent of GDP, respectively.  It is, 
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however, important to bear in mind the contrast in the overall sizes of the countries' respective 
manufacturing sectors.  Even using ICP measures, that in Japan was six times larger than that in 
Korea and 15 times larger than those in either Australia or the Philippines.3 
 In the model, each sector comprises a number of identical oligopolistic firms and each 
firm bears recurrent fixed costs.  Minimum efficient scale (MES) in each is defined (following 
Harris) as the level of output at which average cost exceeds marginal cost by one per cent.  The 
magnitude of recurrent fixed costs then depends on the MES and the slope of the average cost 
curve.  Estimates for these parameters are derived using the Harris approach, as explained in 
Tyers et al. (2004).  Of course, to cover these fixed costs, firms must be able to set prices above 
their average variable costs.  Their capacity to do this without being undercut by existing 
competitors then determines the level of any pure profits and the potential for the entry of new 
firms (the coverage of additional fixed costs).  If entry is free, pure profits attract new entrants 
and the mark-up over variable costs is exhausted entirely by fixed costs.  This is the case of 
"inefficient entry" (Eastman and Stykolt 1966, Horstman and Markusen 1986).  The key, 
therefore, to the characterisation of imperfectly competitive manufacturing firms is in their 
product pricing behaviour and, in particular, their capacity to maintain mark-ups over average 
variable costs.  But, since the way policy shocks affect this behaviour and the extent of 
excessive entry depends on the number of "representative" identical firms, it is appropriate to 
consider first the estimation of firm numbers. 
 
The number of representative identical firms: 
 The necessity to work with only 12 industry categories stretches the assumption that 
firms in each are identical.   The distribution of firm size in such broadly defined industry 
categories often has a modest number of very large firms and a large number of small firms.  
This pattern is interpreted as representing small numbers of oligopolistic leading firms 
                                                 
3 Greater product diversity and differentiation are probably associated with the larger volume of Japanese 
manufacturing.  Moreover, it is possible that external economies exist which, because of its size, enhance the 
overall productivity of Japanese manufacturing.  These effects have not been quantified here. 
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depending upon large numbers of relatively competitive suppliers of components.4  It is then 
most realistic to model this as an oligopoly among the large firms, each of which incorporates its 
suppliers of components.  In all four countries, the size distribution of manufacturing firms is 
available in terms of employment.  The number of representative firms was then chosen as that 
including firms with more than 200 employees in the Philippines (World Bank 1987), more than 
300 in Japan (Statistics Bureau 1986), and more than 500 in Australia (ABS 1989) and the 
Republic of Korea (UN 1987). 
 
Unrealised scale economies: 
 A crude indication of the extent to which there has been inefficient entry can be obtained 
from the ratio of the MES and the average output of representative firms in each industry, as in 
Table 3.  The extent to which this exceeds unity indicates the level of unrealised scale 
economies and hence the extent of prior "excessive entry".  For manufacturing as a whole, these 
appear to have been largest in the two net importers of manufactures.  Indeed, the ranking on 
unrealised scale economies is precisely the opposite of that on the size of manufacturing sector 
(Table 1).  In Japan, scale economies in manufacturing appear to have been exhausted except in 
food processing.  In pre- “microeconomic reform” Australia, they remained unexploited in both 
light manufacturing, including food processing and textiles and clothing, and also in heavy 
manufacturing, particularly in the production of paper, transport equipment and machinery.  In 
the developing economies, it is in the heavy industries that they remained unexploited in 
manufacturing, including chemicals, transport equipment and other machinery, where fixed 
costs were comparatively high. 
 
Pure profits: 
 That proportion of mark-ups over unit variable costs not absorbed by fixed costs accrues 
                                                 
4 This characterisation seems particularly appropriate in the cases of Japan and Korea, where large oligopolistic 
firms have large numbers of smaller affiliates which supply inputs.  See, for example, Fruin (1992). 
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as pure profits.  The implied excess rate of return on capital in each of the four economies is 
indicated in Table 4.  They were more modest fractions of total manufacturing costs (averaging 
5, 11, -8 and 4 per cent in Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Korea, respectively) than of 
overall GDP (shown in the top line of the table).  Again, the losses in the Philippines reflect the 
particular year for which the database was available.  Interestingly, the protected textile, 
clothing and footwear sector in Australia appears to have remained profitable in spite of 
growing import competition at the time.  Not so the similarly protected transport equipment 
sector.  In Japan, the overall economic health of the time is reflected in pure profits in all 
manufacturing industries. 
 
Pricing behaviour: 
 The luxuries of excessive entry and pure profits are afforded only by virtue of oligopoly 
pricing.  In setting their prices, firms are assumed to know the level and elasticity of sectoral 
demand and the number of their identical competitors.  They play a game in the selection of 
quantities.  For this comparative static analysis it is convenient to abstract from the multi-period 
nature of this game and to represent their capacity to collude by a fixed conjectural variations 
parameter, µi, defined as the influence any individual firm has over the entire output of industry 
i.  Thus, the profit-maximising mark-up, derived by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal 
cost, vi is 
Where εi is the price elasticity of demand for home goods in industry i (defined negative), ni is 
the number of firms, and 
where Qi and qi are industry and firm output.  Notable values of the conjectural variations 
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parameter are µi = 0, 1, ni, representing perfect competition, non-collusive (Cournot) oligopoly 
or a colluding cartel. 
 The product of each industry can either be consumed directly, used as an intermediate 
input in another industry or it can be exported.  The elasticity εi therefore depends on the shares 
of the home product going to each of the three markets and the elasticities in each.  As explained 
in the Appendix, the elasticities of final consumption and export demand depend principally on 
the elasticities of substitution between home goods and their foreign substitutes.  Because of the 
Cobb-Douglas function used for unit variable costs, however, those of intermediate demand tend 
to have magnitudes less than unity.  Importantly, in this formulation the precise values of εi 
depend only very weakly on border distortions.  When trade policy is changed, the principal 
mechanism by which εi is altered is the redistribution of demand amongst its three components.  
Reference values for εi are listed in Table 5, along with the corresponding elasticities of 
substitution.5 
 Since the mark-up in each industry covers both fixed costs and pure profits, it can be 
estimated as the ratio of the sum of these and total product value, drawn from the SAM.  Indirect 
estimates of the ratios µi/ni then follow from equation (1).  This ratio forms an index of non-
competitive pricing.  It ranges from zero (perfect competition, zero mark-ups) to unity (perfect 
cartel, monopoly mark-ups).   The values thus calibrated are given in Table 6.  Pricing appears 
generally to have been collusive, though only rarely did firms achieve more than a quarter of the 
discipline of a perfect cartel.  Also shown in the table are the ratios which would apply in a non-
collusive, or Cournot, oligopoly when the ratio takes the value 1/ni.  Note that, while the original 
index could be calibrated with some confidence from available data, its non-collusive 
counterpart depends on less robust estimates of the number of representative identical firms, ni. 
 The smallest gulf between calibrated values and the non-collusive case occurred in 
                                                 
5 It might seem anomalous that the elasticities of demand for agricultural products are quite high, when, by 
reputation, commodity demand is inelastic.  The key here is that these are elasticities of demand for home varieties. 
 Commodities tend to be highly substitutable with imports and so home product demand is elastic even though total 
demand for these products need not be. 
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Australia and by far the largest in Japan.  It comes as no surprise that the non-collusive ratio for 
Japan was low.  The comparatively large size of Japan's manufacturing sector was associated 
with a correspondingly large number of representative oligopolistic firms.  Policy reforms that 
reduce the capacity of firms to collude would have had their largest proportional effects on 
prices in Japan.6  Non-collusive pricing would have forced the virtual disappearance of mark-
ups in Japan and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Korea and the Philippines.  In Australia, however, 
where the number of firms is smallest, non-collusive mark-ups would be set at about a quarter of 
the calibrated levels. 
 
4. Trade Reform 
 The 1980s pattern of protection in all four economies, summarised in Table 7, gave most 
assistance to import-competing producers.  The net importers of manufactures, Australia and the 
Philippines, both protected their manufacturing sectors and the net manufacturing exporters, 
Japan and Korea, both protected their agricultural sectors.  But the pattern was more complex 
than this.  In Australia, substantial protection was afforded the labour-intensive end of 
manufacturing, while in the Philippines the capital-intensive end was most favoured.  In Japan, 
although manufacturing protection was low overall, the food processing was highly protected.  
In Korea, although the other sectors appear to have received greater assistance, a substantial 
residue of the old import substituting regime remained through the mid-1980s, particularly in 
metals and labour-intensive manufactures.7 
 To examine the consequences of trade reform in the period and their sensitivity to model 
formulation, the following experiments are performed. 
1. A reference equilibrium is calculated to reproduce the model databases on the assumption that 
                                                 
6 The comparatively large size of the Japanese manufacturing sector suggests that it had greater product diversity 
than the three smaller countries.  The combination of a fixed sectoral disaggregation and the assumption of within 
industry product homogeneity do not admit the representation of such differences in diversity.  Hence, the potential 
decline in mark-ups from more competitive pricing is most likely overestimated in the case of Japan. 
7 The protection of services, which are consolidated in this study, is difficult to gauge from available publications 
of the period.  Although it is set to zero in the industrial countries, this is unlikely to be accurate (Dee and Hanslow 
2000). 
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manufacturing firms were perfectly competitive and had constant returns to scale.8 
2. All trade distortions are removed and a new equilibrium is calculated on the assumption that 
firms are perfectly competitive. 
3. The original model, incorporating imperfectly competitive behaviour, is then used to calculate 
a new "no-entry" reference equilibrium which also reproduces the observed pattern of 
pure profits. 
4. All trade distortions are removed and a new no-entry equilibrium is calculated. 
5. Trade distortions are reinstated and a "free entry" reference equilibrium is calculated.  This 
solution allows firms to enter and exit until pure profits are competed away. 
6. Again, all trade distortions are removed, this time under "free entry" conditions. 
 Thus, three reference equilibria are compared with a corresponding three in which all 
trade distortions are removed.  The resulting estimates of the impacts of trade reform on the size 
and structure of the four economies are summarised in Table 8.  Most striking at the outset is 
that the estimates are robust across the three different formulations of the model.  Allowance for 
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale appears to change value added effects 
little.  As in numerous prior studies of trade reforms, the net gains in economic welfare (the 
income equivalents of which are measured precisely in this case by the real GNP changes 
shown) are small but uniformly positive.  This is in spite of some correspondingly small declines 
in GDP, driven by net reductions in the capital stock as comparatively capital intensive 
industries shrink following the loss of their protection. 
 The structural change which underlies these small changes in overall economic size is 
substantial, however.  Manufacturing shrinks where it had been protected and expands where 
protection is removed elsewhere.  Mining and energy are the big beneficiaries in Australia and 
the Philippines.  Agriculture does not benefit in Australia, for two reasons.  First, it had, at the 
outset, enjoyed some protection.  A post-reform real devaluation does less than offset the loss of 
                                                 
8 Pure profits in this adjusted database are absorbed into market returns on capital and the capital stock and its 
distribution allowed to adjust to retain the original rate of return on capital. 
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that protection.  And second, per unit of output, the agricultural sector is more dependent than 
mining on chemical and fuel inputs, the real costs of which rise after the reform.  In Korea and 
Japan, on the other hand, agriculture shrinks while manufacturing expands.9 
 This structural change is reflected in the associated changes in the unit rewards of 
domestic factors, given in Table 9.  Capital owners are largely indifferent in all formulations by 
virtue of the assumed international mobility of that factor.  Only in the no entry equilibria do 
pure profits occur but the changes in these which accompany trade reform are negligible.  The 
corresponding changes in real unit rewards to domestic factors (those not mobile internationally) 
are more dramatic, however.  Mineral and energy resource rents increase substantially in 
Australia and the Philippines while agricultural land rents decline in Japan and Korea.  Real 
wages rise throughout.  Although all closures of the model set wages to clear labour markets, 
these increases in real wages confirm that even constant real wage solutions would not yield 
increased unemployment.10  Where the beneficiaries of trade reform are the comparatively 
capital intensive mining and energy sectors, the demand for labour is nevertheless boosted by 
increased demand for service inputs to that sector.  Declines in real land rents in Australia, Japan 
and Korea aside, domestic factors are gainers from trade reform.11 
 The response to trade reform by the imperfectly competitive manufacturing sector is 
summarised in Table 10.  Consider first the no entry closure and the two countries in which a 
previously protected manufacturing sector contracts.  Trade reform reduces the relative prices of 
competing imported manufactures.  This is partially offset by real devaluations and lower home 
prices due to the reduced cost of imported intermediates, which also enhance the 
                                                 
9 The latter expansion is greatest in the case of Korea where the large services sector had been characterised as 
receiving a high level of protection.  The services sector shrinks so as to benefit manufacturing both through the 
supply of cheaper service inputs and through its release of domestic factors the unit rewards to which would 
otherwise have shown larger increases. 
10 In the course of each solution, however, trade reform lowers the domestic price level and nominal wages most 
often fall (but, by less than the price level).  Sticky nominal wages would therefore cause increased unemployment 
following trade reform.  For an analysis of the effects of nominal wage rigidity following trade reform, see Rees 
and Tyers (2004). 
11 That these gains are most often larger than those in real GNP reflects the loss of tariff revenue, previously 
transferred directly to households, and its replacement by increased factor income. 
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competitiveness of exports abroad.  Home products are redistributed away from final (and, to a 
lesser extent, intermediate) demand to meet increased export demand.  This increases the 
elasticity of demand facing home manufacturers very slightly.  Mark-ups, as given by equation 
(1), fall but by very little.  Thus, there is no significant "pro-competitiveness" effect of trade 
reform in this case.12  Pure profits change very little and the changes in the scale of production, 
corresponding with the associated changes in output at the industry level, are too small to 
significantly affect average fixed costs. 
 In the free entry closure, trade reform first induces pure losses in both the Australian and 
the Philippine manufacturing sectors.  This forces exit by three and five per cent of firms, 
respectively.  Instead of making pricing behaviour more competitive, however, this raises the 
index of imperfectly competitive pricing (Table 6) and increases mark-ups (though only very 
slightly13).  Whether the firms which remain produce at a more efficient scale then depends on 
the change in industry output.  If this declines by less than the reduction in the number of firms, 
as in Australia, then value added per firm rises.  Any scale gain is offset by more collusive 
pricing, however.   In Japan and Korea, on the other hand, trade reform enhances the overall 
profitability of manufacturing, induces entry by a small number of additional firms and the 
sector expands enough to ensure that value added per manufacturing firm increases.  The reform 
is unambiguously pro-competitive in these countries but, again, the changes are so slight as to 
have an almost negligible effect on prices. 
 
5. Non-Collusive Pricing 
 Firms are here assumed to be induced to price without collusion through revisions to 
competition law and more active trade practices surveillance.  In both the no entry and the free 
entry cases, the model is shocked with reductions in the index of imperfectly competitive pricing 
                                                 
12 For a more complete discussion of pro-competitive effects, see Hertel (1994), Ianchovichina et al. (2000) and 
Hertel et al. (2002). 
13 The elasticity of the mark-up to the index of competitive pricing, when the elasticity of demand is about two 
(Table 5), is about 0.1.  Thus, a five per cent reduction in the number of firms induces a 0.5 per cent increase in the 
mark-up. 
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from µi/ni to 1/ni.  In general, this forces substantial reductions in mark-ups and hence in product 
prices in the manufacturing sector.  Domestic demand shifts away from imports toward home 
products and export demand increases as lower export prices cause substitution abroad.  The 
decline in import volume, and the associated rise in export volume, causes a real appreciation 
and hence a decline in the general price level.  Output expands in all sectors, raising demand for 
domestic factors, real unit rewards to which rise. 
 The net effects on the size and structure of the economy are summarised in Table 11.   
The gains in aggregate welfare (as indicated by real GNP), and in output (GDP) are large by 
comparison with those due to trade reform.  In the no entry closure all sectors tend to expand 
their value added.  The Philippines is the single exception, for reasons to be returned to later.  
Agriculture is a consistent beneficiary, though the expansion in manufacturing comes at the cost 
of substantial pure losses, incurred by firms unable to exit.  This quite large expansion is the 
consequence of the demand boost in response to reduced mark-ups and hence lower 
manufacturing product prices.  The gains in GDP in this case are tempered by the transition 
from pure profits in manufacturing to pure losses. 
 Price reform yields even larger net gains in welfare and output in the free entry case.  
Then, the pure losses initially induced by lower manufacturing product prices cause more than 
half the firms to exit.  As they do so, mark-ups rise again, but to values well short of their pre-
reform levels.  The burden of recurrent fixed costs is substantially reduced by the decline in the 
number of firms so value added in manufacturing (factor cost) shrinks.  But the volume of 
output (and hence the cost of variable factors) is universally larger.  The increases in this volume 
are smaller than those which occur in the no entry case because mark-ups are higher and hence 
the expansion in aggregate demand for manufactures is smaller.  Even more important than the 
differences in mark-ups in moderating the expansion in demand for home goods is that the 
reduction in the number of firms and hence in the fixed capital stock in manufacturing is so 
large that expansions in the other sectors are insufficient to prevent declines, of between three 
and nine per cent, in the overall capital stock.  These changes are large in proportion to the 
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foreign owned part of that stock and hence there is a big decline in repatriated returns on capital 
in the balance of payments.  This magnifies the real revaluation which occurs, lowering the 
relative cost of imported substitutes.  The free entry closure yields larger gains in welfare and 
GDP because the burden of fixed costs is reduced and the reform induces no pure losses. 
 The changes in real unit rewards to domestic factors are summarised in Table 12.  Apart 
from the loss of pure profits by domestic capital owners in the no entry case, gains are virtually 
universal.  They are larger in the no entry case than in the free entry case since, in the latter, 
oligopoly rents are larger and these accrue to capital, part of the income from which leaks 
abroad.  The only declines are in mineral and energy rents in the Philippines (no entry case) and 
in the skilled wage in Korea (free entry case).  The latter arises because recurrent fixed costs 
include skilled labour costs.  When the number of firms declines, fixed costs are reduced 
proportionally and hence so is the demand for fixed skilled labour.  This source of demand for 
skilled labour is comparatively large in Korea and so the change is sufficient to reduce overall 
demand for skilled labour. 
 The extent of some of the changes in manufacturing industry structure is indicated in 
Table 13.  In the no entry case, where the decline in home product prices is most substantial, 
capital is drawn into manufacturing to meet increased demand.  This increase in product volume 
raises value added per firm but fixed capital costs are not covered at the lower prices and what 
were pure profits under collusive pricing become pure losses.  In the free entry case, the lower 
prices cause pure losses which are subsequently eliminated by the departure from the market of 
more than half its firms and the resulting decline in average fixed costs.  Value added per firm 
rises very substantially. 
 In many respects the behaviour of the Philippines departs from the general pattern 
described here.  This has most to do with assumptions made in assembling the Philippine data 
base.  It was quickly apparent that firms in six of the manufacturing industries (garments, 
textiles and footwear; wood and paper; chemicals; mineral products; transport equipment; and 
miscellaneous manufactures) were loss-making in 1983.  These industries accounted for 60 per 
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cent of manufacturing value added in that year.  Moreover, in four of these industries, prices in 
that year appeared not even to be covering average variable costs.  This made it nonsensical to 
calibrate a coefficient of imperfectly competitive pricing from equation (1) for those industries. 
 It is, however, no impediment to the reference and counterfactual equilibria in the no 
entry case.  Accordingly, that reference equilibrium incorporates the low prices charged in those 
industries.  When Cournot pricing is imposed on all firms in the counterfactual equilibrium, 
prices in former loss-making firms rise to more than cover all average costs.  Thus, in the 
Philippine no-entry case, the direction of average manufacturing prices is therefore the opposite 
of those in the other three economies.14  In the free entry case the Philippine model behaves 
much like the others.  For the reference free entry equilibrium, the assumption is made that, in 
more normal years, firms in loss-making industries would play Cournot and price non-
collusively.  When non-collusive pricing is imposed on all firms, mark-ups fall on less than half 
the output of the sector and hence the observed benefits are muted relative to those observed in 
the other economies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This comparison of the potential gains from trade reform and more competitive pricing 
behaviour in manufacturing suggests that the gains are larger from more competitive behaviour 
and, moreover, that they are more nearly Pareto improving.  This is most clearly true in the long 
run when free entry and exit of firms is a more appropriate assumption.  Then, where capital is 
mobile internationally, the rate of return earned by domestic capital owners is unaffected by 
either change of policy.  Whereas trade reform redistributes rents away from factors in which 
protected industries are intensive, while yielding a small net gain across the whole economy, 
more competitive pricing behaviour reduces the price level, raises the volume of home 
                                                 
14 The reason why the minerals and energy sector contracts in the Philippines when manufacturers are forced to 
price non-collusively (Table 11) is that manufacturing industries which are intensive in the products of that sector 
tend to be the ones in which prices rise in this experiment.  They contract and so, therefore, does the mining and 
energy sector.  The decline in mineral rents indicated in Table 12 follows. 
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production and of exports and enhances the purchasing power of all non-mobile factor rewards. 
 The analysis of similar reforms in the four “archetype” Western Pacific economies does 
show that the dependence of the gains from reform on economic structure is significant.  The 
specification used causes the introduction of imperfectly competitive behaviour not to yield 
large differences in the effects of trade reform on overall economic activity in any of the 
countries.  When the reforms include changes to competition policy and hence oligopoly pricing 
behaviour, however, this dependence is greatly strengthened.  The large size of Japan’s 
manufacturing sector in the 1980s and the substantial pure profits it then enjoyed, meant that the 
potential gains from competition reform would have been larger in proportion to its GNP than 
for the other countries.  This result suggests that competition reforms in Japan in the late 1980s 
might not only have boosted growth at a time when the economy was slowing but also that, with 
better-distributed rents, the collapse of the 1990s and the subsequent economic stagnation might 
have been mitigated or even avoided. 
 In measuring these effects, however, two important caveats suggest further research.  
First, the assumption of product homogeneity within any manufacturing industry, combined 
with a uniform sectoral disaggregation irrespective of economic size, overlooks the possibility 
that product diversity was much greater in the larger manufacturing sectors such as that of 
Japan.  It is therefore likely that the extent of any collusion in pricing is overestimated in such 
cases, and so, therefore, are the potential gains from more competitive behaviour.  The solution 
to this problem is not necessarily to jump to a differentiated products model of the Spence-Dixit-
Stiglitz type (Hertel 1994).  The same judgement must be made there about the degree of 
differentiation (or the elasticity of substitution) between varieties.  A first approximation might 
adjust the number of representative firms according to the level of product diversity. 
 Second, calibrated general equilibrium models are vulnerable to the peculiarities of those 
years for which complete sets of data (principally input-output tables) are available.  The 1983 
Philippine database, for example, is extraordinary in the extent of the manufacturing losses 
incurred.  This made it difficult to calibrate the "normal" pricing behaviour of manufacturing 
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firms in that country.  A larger investment is needed in database assembly in such cases. 
 Finally, manufacturing is not the only sector in which oligopoly behaviour is influential. 
 Indeed, in many industrial countries the focus of pro-competitive reforms is the services sector. 
 The models used here are clearly imbalanced in their consolidation of services and further work 
might attempt an examination of imperfectly competitive behaviour in parts of that sector. 
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 Table 1  Economic size and structure 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Population, millions 17 124 61 43 
 
GDP, US$ billions 296 2,943 44 236 
 
GDP per capita, US$ 17,000 25,400 730 5,400 
     ICP estimatea  16,100 17,000 7,200 2,300 
 
GDP in manufacturing, US$ billions 45 829 11 66 
     ICP estimatea  41 610 35 96 
 
The distribution of GDP, % 
     Agriculture  4  3 20 13 
     Mining  4 1 6 1 
     Services  75 68 44 57 
     Manufacturing 15 28 29 29 
 
The distribution of 
  manufacturing GDP, % 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 18 11 30 12 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 6 4 10 12 
 Wood and paper products 17 4 5 4 
 Chemicals 7 7 9 21 
 Petroleum and coal products 5 4 2 2 
 Mineral products 24 17 9 6 
 Transport equiptment 8 12 4 10 
 Machinery 10 29 23 23 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 5 11 7 6 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a United Nations International Comparison Progam. 
 
Source:  Population and GDP estimates are for 1990, drawn from World Bank (1992).  GDP in 
manufacturing is for 1989, from the same source.  GDP shares are from the SAMs detailed in Tyers et al. 
(2004). 
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 Table 2  The balance of payments 
 
 (per cent of GDP) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Inflows 
 
 Transfers  15  .5 19 18 
 
 Exports  16 14 17 37 
 
  Agriculture 2 .3 .7 .7 
  Minerals 4 .0 1.4 .1 
  Services 4 3 7 8 
  Manufactures 6 12 9 29 
 
 Total  31 15 36 54 
 
 
Outflows 
 
 Market returns on capital 11 3 14 9 
 
 Repatriated pure profits .8 .9 -1.4 1.4 
 
 Export subsidies .7 .4 1.2 5 
 
 Imports  18 11 23 39 
 
  Agriculture .3 1.1 .3 3 
  Minerals .5 4 3.3 9 
  Services 2 2 .6 3 
  Manufactures 15 4 18 24 
 
 Total  31 15 36 54 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  Tyers et al. (2004). 
  
 
 22
 Table 3   Unrealised scale economies in manufacturinga 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
All manufacturing 3.6 1.1 6.4 2.5 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 3.0 2.0 1.1 3.0 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 
 
 Wood and paper products 5.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 
 
 Chemicals 1.7 1.0 2.2 2.5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.5 
 
 Mineral products 4.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 
 
 Transport equipment 5.0 1.0 116 3.0 
 
 Machinery 3.2 1.0 3.3 4.0 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 5.0 1.0 2.9 3.0 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The ratio of minimum efficient scale (MES) to average firm output. 
 
Source:  Estimates of MES based on those of Gupta and Fuss (1979) and adapted for application to the four 
economies, combined with estimates of the numbers of oligopolistic firms, as explained in Tyers et al. 
(2004). 
 m
q n * MES = 
q Q
      
  
 
 23
 Table 4  Rates of economic profit in manufacturinga, per cent 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
All manufacturing 9 20 -4 5 
 (Per cent of GDP) (2) (9) (-4) (5) 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 12 33 16 7 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 37 8 -7 2 
 
 Wood and paper products 14 9 -12 -27 
 
 Chemicals 21 20 -8 7 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 23 30 68 5 
 
 Mineral products 4 16 -12 -11 
 
 Transport equipment -5 16 -18 -2 
 
 Machinery 6 23 2 17 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 10 24 -4 27 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
a The ratio of pure profits to the value of the capital stock in each industry in the reference SAM.  The 
losses in the Philippines are large enough in some sectors that firms are not fully covering variable costs.  
This may well be representative of the state of that economy in 1983. 
 
Source:  All are drawn from the SAMs, as explained in Tyers et al. (2004). 
 i
iK
π      
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 Table 5  Elasticities of substitution in demand and of demand for home goodsa, per cent 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Elast. Price elasticities of demand, ε 
 of ______________________________________ 
 substn. 
 σ Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
     of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Agriculture  2.8 -2.7 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 
 
Mining  2.8 -3.3 -2.0 -2.6 -2.1 
 
Services  1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -2.1 -1.9 
 
All manufacturingb 2.9 -2.4 -2.3 -2.5 -2.6 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 2.2 -2.4 -2.0 -2.2 -2.0 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 3.0 -2.6 -2.3 -2.9 -3.1 
 
 Wood and paper products 2.3 -2.1 -1.9 -2.4 -2.2 
 
 Chemicals 1.9 -1.8 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0
 
 Petroleum and coal products 2.8 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 
 
 Mineral products 2.8 -2.4 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
 
 Transport equipment 5.2 -3.2 -3.0 -3.5 -2.8
 
 Machinery 2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -3.0 -3.1 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 2.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3 -3.8 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The elasticity of substitution, σ, is defined positive and, for each sector, set the same in each country. 
 The elasticities of demand are with respect to home product prices.  They are for an aggregate of direct or 
final demand, intermediate demand and export demand, as explained in Appendix 1.  Unlike the elasticities 
of substitution, which are permanent parameters, these change as the mix of these three types of demand 
change. 
 
b The aggregate, for all manufactures, is an average of the component industry values, using value 
added shares as weights. 
 
Source:  The elasticities of substitution are drawn from Stern et al. (1976) and Industry Commission (1991). 
 The demand elasticities are calculated from them as indicated in Tyers et al. (2004).  
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 Table 6  Index of non-competitive pricinga, per cent 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All manufacturingb 25,   7 28,  .3 14,   2 24,   2 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 24,   3 27,  .3 20,  .6 16,   2 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 19,  10 12,  .4 1,  .6 4,  .6 
 
 Wood and paper products 36,   7 15,  .3 1,  .9 6,   6 
 
 Chemicals 21,  25 27,  .3 2,   2 21,   5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 22,  20 35,   2 11,  20 16,   1 
  
 Mineral products 24,   3 24,  .2 2,   2 1,   3 
 
 Transport equipment 22,   2 27,  .2 43,   4 3,   3 
 
 Machinery 18,   5 37,  .1 24,   1 48,  .6 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 26,  20 28,  .4 3,   3 53,   8 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The ratio of the conjectural variations parameter, µ, and the number of oligopolistic firms in each 
sector, from equation (1).  The first ratio is that observed, while the second applies to non-collusive, or 
Cournot, pricing behaviour.  The upper limit is 100 %, signifying a perfect cartel.  The lower limit is 0 %, 
signifying perfect competition. 
 
b The all-manufacturing estimates are averages across manufacturing industries, with value added 
shares as weights. 
 
Source:  The indices are calibrated using equation (1).  Once estimates of the mark-up and the elasticity of 
demand for each home product are available, the ratios listed here follow.  The mark-ups are derived from 
the SAM, and the elasticities of demand depend primarily on estimates of elasticities of substitution, as 
explained in the Appendix.  Their estimation is explained in Tyers et al. (2004). 
 i
i i
1, 
n n
µ      
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 Table 7  The nominal rate of protectiona 
 
 
 (per cent) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Agriculture  7 70 13 49 
 
Mining  0 0 9 1 
 
Services  0 0 10 50 
 
Food, beverages and tobacco 8 55 35 28 
 
Garments, textiles and footwear 33 11 42 14 
 
Wood and paper products 13 3 18 10 
 
Chemicals  10 6 51 6 
 
Petroleum and coal products 0 4 27 9 
 
Mineral products 9 3 50 16 
 
Transport equipment 23 2 98 6 
 
Machinery  16 4 41 7 
 
Miscellaneous manufactures 19 5 49 16 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The proportion by which the domestic price, adjusted for infrastructural costs, exceeds that at the 
border.  The same proportions are assumed to apply to ad valorem tariff equivalents on imports (t) and ad 
valorem export subsidy equivalents on exports (s). 
 
Source:  For Australia the estimates are from Industry Assistance Commission (1987), for Japan 
Saxonhouse and Stern (1989), for the Philippines they are from unpublished data supplied by the Philippine 
Tariff Commission, and for Korea they are from Kim (1988). 
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 Table 8  Effects of trade reform on economic structurea 
 
 (per cent change) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
GNPb  Perfect competition .4 .3  .1  
  Oligopoly, no entry .4 .6 .8 3.2 
  Oligopoly, free entry .4 .3   .6 3.1 
 
GDP  Perfect competition -1.2 -.2 -4.5  
  Oligopoly, no entry -1.1  .0 -4.6 .5 
  Oligopoly, free entry -1.1 -.1 -5.1 .5 
 
Value added at factor costc 
 Agriculture 
  Perfect competition -.3 -5.7 4.5  
  Oligopoly, no entry -.2 -5.4 4.4 -1.0 
  Oligopoly, free entry -.5 -5.5 4.1 -1.1 
 
 Mining/energy 
  Perfect competition 9.2 1.4 11.4  
  Oligopoly, no entry 9.2 1.4 11.5 1.1 
  Oligopoly, free entry 8.7 1.7 11.7 1.3 
 
 Services 
  Perfect competition .8 .6 5.0  
  Oligopoly, no entry .8 .9 4.9 -1.2 
  Oligopoly, free entry .7 .7 4.7 -1.1 
 
 Manufacturing 
  Perfect competition -3.1 1.2 -6.6  
  Oligopoly, no entry -2.0 1.6 -4.5 3.0 
  Oligopoly, free entry -2.9 1.8 -5.2 3.1 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Three separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair are constructed on the presumption 
that perfect competition and constant returns to scale prevail in manufacturing.  The others presume 
oligopolistic behaviour with either no entry or exit of firms or free entry or exit. 
 
b GNP includes "transfers" from abroad but excludes repatriated returns on capital.  GDP excludes the 
former and includes the latter. 
 
c Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the Appendix. 
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 Table 9  Effects of trade reform on real factor rewardsa 
 
 (per cent change in unit rewardb) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skilled labour 
 Perfect competition  .7  .8  1.5  
 Oligopoly, no entry  .9 1.0 1.7 .1 
 Oligopoly, free entry  .8 1.1 2.2 .1 
 
Unskilled labour 
 Perfect competition .0  .7 3.6  
 Oligopoly, no entry .1  .9 3.5 .1 
 Oligopoly, free entry .0 .9 3.6  .3 
 
Agricultural land 
 Perfect competition -.0 -5.5 4.4  
 Oligopoly, no entry -.1    -5.2 4.3 -1.0 
 Oligopoly, free entry   -.0 -5.2 4.0 -1.0 
 
Mineral resources 
 Perfect competition 8.9  .9 11.2  
 Oligopoly, no entry 9.0 1.1 11.2 2.0 
 Oligopoly, free entry 9.1 1.2 11.7 2.1 
 
Capital 
 Perfect competition .0 .0 .0 .0 
 Oligopoly, no entry -.1 -.0 -.2 -.1 
 Oligopoly, free entry .0 .0 .0 .0 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Three separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair are constructed on the presumption 
that perfect competition and constant returns to scale prevail in manufacturing.  The others presume 
oligopolistic behaviour with either no entry or exit of firms or free entry or exit. 
 
b Proportional changes in unit rewards, measured relative to the price of the consumption basket in the 
reference equilibrium. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the appendix. 
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 Table 10  Effects of trade reform on imperfectly competitive manufacturinga 
 
 (per cent change, unless otherwise indicated) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Manufacturing capital stock 
 No entry -2.1 -1.5 -.2 .2 
 Free entry -2.2 .6 -12.3 .1 
 
Pure profitsb 
 No entry -8 1 -9c 5 
 
Excess rate of return on 
manufacturing capital, no entry case, % 
 Reference 9.4 20.1 -4.7 5.2 
 Trade reform 8.9 20.5 -5.1 5.4 
 
Number of firms 
 No entry .0 .0 .0 .0 
 Free entry -2.5 .4 -4.7 .3 
 
Value added per firmd 
 No entry -2.0 1.6 -4.5 3.0 
 Free entry  .7 1.5 -.1 2.5 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair presumes oligopolistic behaviour with 
no entry or exit of firms while the second allows free entry and exit. 
 
b In the free entry case, pure profits are zero in both the reference equilibrium and the trade reform 
equilibrium. 
 
c In the Philippines, economic losses are enlarged by this proportion. 
 
d Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the appendix. 
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 Table 11  Effects of non-collusive pricing on economic structurea 
 
 (per cent change) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
GNPb  No entry 1.1 1.6 .8 1.5 
  Free entry 1.9 3.7   2.1 4.4 
 
GDP  No entry   .7  1.6   .1 -.1 
  Free entry  1.5 2.6  2.0 2.3 
 
Value added at factor costc 
 Agriculture 
  No entry 5.7 15.5 5.4  7.0 
  Free entry 2.6  9.4 3.9  6.9 
 
 Mining/energy 
  No entry 1.6 39.6 -5.8 13.3 
  Free entry  .7 12.3  1.3 9.2 
 
 Services 
  No entry 2.3 7.0  .0  5.3 
  Free entry 2.5 5.2 2.4  5.7 
 
 Manufacturing 
  No entry 14.3 35.3 -3.8 19.5 
  Free entry -5.3 -4.1  1.7 -8.4 
 
Gross value of manufacturing output 
at old pricesd 
  No entry 18 43 -1 23 
  Free entry 11 13 6 14 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared, in each case one having calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assuming non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b GNP includes "transfers" from abroad but excludes repatriated returns on capital.  GDP excludes the 
former and includes the latter. 
 
c Value added at factor cost, as represented here, excludes pure profits. 
 
d Old prices are reference database prices. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the appendix. 
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 Table 12  Effects of non-collusive pricing on real factor rewardsa 
 
 (per cent change in unit rewardb) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skilled labour 
  No entry 4.1 14.3 .5 8.7 
  Free entry 1.4 1.6  3.9 -6.2 
 
Unskilled labour 
  No entry 5.3 15.3 1.9 10.0 
  Free entry 4.1 6.8  3.9 8.1 
 
Agricultural land 
  No entry 6.0 15.4 5.3 7.1 
  Free entry 3.3 9.2  3.9 6.6 
 
Mineral resources 
  No entry 2.0 40.0 -6.1 13.1 
  Free entry 1.2 12.0 1.3 9.4 
 
Capital 
  No entry -1.3 -2.5 -.4 -2.9 
  Free entry .0 .0 .0 .0 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared, in each case one having calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assuming non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b Proportional changes in unit rewards, measured relative to the price of the consumption basket in the 
reference equilibrium. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the appendix. 
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 Table 13  Effects of non-collusive pricing on imperfectly competitive manufacturinga 
 
 (per cent change, unless otherwise indicated) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Manufacturing capital stock 
 No entry  5.7 21.7 -6.2 8.0 
 Free entry -28.2 -32.7 -3.0 -33.2 
 
Pure profitsb 
 No entry  -139 -115 15c -200 
 (change as per cent of GDP) (-3) (-11) (1) (-9) 
 
Excess rate of return on 
manufacturing capital, no entry case, % 
 Reference 9.4 20.1 -4.2 5.2 
 Non-collusive pricing -3.4 -2.3 -3.8 -4.8 
 
Number of firms 
 No entry  0 0 0 0 
 Free entry -51 -85 -58 -67 
 
Value added per firmd 
 No entry   14.3 35.3 -3.8 19.6 
 Free entry 93 654 243 280 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  In each case one has calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assumes non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b In the free entry case, pure profits are zero in both the reference equilibrium and the trade reform 
equilibrium. 
 
c The magnitude of the Philippine loss is reduced by this proportion. 
 
d Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
  
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model discussed in Part II and the appendix. 
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Appendix 
 Components of the model are presented in the order in which they appear in its solution. 
 A "no entry" solution, in which the numbers of firms is held constant, is first derived.  This 
solution iterates on the vector [e,w], comprising the exchange rate, e (expressed as foreign 
currency units per unit of local currency) and a vector of non-capital factor rewards, w.  In the 
reference equilibrium, all elements of this vector are unity, and the search for counterfactual 
equilibria generally begins with these values.  Next, product prices and the quantities produced, 
consumed and traded are calculated, from which are derived any foreign payments imbalance or 
any non-capital factor market excess demands or supplies.  Depending on the closure chosen, 
acceptably small values may be required for these disequilibria.  To achieve these targets, the 
exchange rate and the factor rewards are adjusted and the no-entry solution recomputed.  If firm 
entry and exit are permitted, the no-entry solution is tested for economic profits or losses in each 
industry.  If these exceed an acceptable tolerance level, the vector of firm numbers in each 
sector, n, is adjusted and a new no-entry solution is sought.  This process is repeated until 
convergence is achieved and no further incentive remains for firm entry or exit. 
 
The no-entry solution for given [e,w]: 
 The number of representative identical firms, n = [ni, i=1,N sectors] is held constant.  
The rate of return on capital, r, is also exogenous, since capital is homogeneous and 
internationally mobile.  The initial vector of unit rewards to domestic factors is w = [wk, k=1,K 
non-capital factors].  The steps are as follows: 
 
1. Demand elasticities facing domestic industries, ε 
 These must be calculated first, since oligopoly pricing behaviour depends on them.  They 
depend on many other variables in the model, however, so it is best that their formulation be 
described once the core equations of the model have been presented.  For now we will take these 
as given. 
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2. Mark-ups over marginal (unit variable) cost 
  We assume constant marginal cost oligopolistic firms in homogeneous product markets. 
 The profit-maximising mark-up is derived by setting marginal revenue equal to unit variable (or 
marginal) cost, v.  The result is 
Where 
and Qi and qi are industry and firm output in sector i, respectively.  Note that µi = 0,1,ni implies, 
respectively, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly or a colluding cartel. 
 
3. Domestic prices of imported goods 
Where Pi is the (exogenous) foreign currency price of goods produced in the rest of the world, 
and ti is the equivalent ad valorem tariff rate. 
 
4. Domestic prices of home products 
 Production is Cobb-Douglas in variable factors and inputs, with output elasticities αi for 
capital, βki for factors k and γji for inputs j.  The subaggregation of imported and domestic inputs 
is also Cobb-Douglas, thus assuming unit elasticities of substitution, with expenditure shares on 
home inputs τji.  First, unit variable costs are calculated as: 
where the scale coefficient, bi, is calibrated from the SAM, as are all the exponents in the 
i
i
ii
i i
p 1(A1.1)      =  =            im
v 1 + 
n
µ
ε
∀  
i
i
i
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q
µ ∂∂   
* i i
i
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e
∀  
 
ji ji jikii
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i i k j j
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(A1.3)      =      [             ip p ]v b wr γβ τ τα ∀∏ ∏  , 
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equation.  Then, domestic prices follow as: 
Together, these yield: 
This is a set of N linear simultaneous equations in pi which is readily solved by matrix inversion.  
 
5. Unit factor and input demands 
 These follow from cost minimisation by firms whose production is Cobb-Douglas in 
variable factors and inputs.  Although these firms are oligopolistic in product markets, they are 
price takers in both factor and input markets.  The unit factor demands for capital and other 
factors, respectively, are: 
  iL kiki
k
 v(A1.7)      =            k, iu
w
β ∀  
 The unit input demands are just Leontief input-output coefficients, except that their 
values depend on product and input prices.  For home-produced and imported inputs, 
respectively, they are: 
  ji iji*ji *
j
 (1- ) v(A1.9)      =            i, jA
p
γ τ ∀  
 
i ii(A1.4)      =             ip vm ∀   
K
ii i kkii
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6. Prices of home product exports in foreign markets: 
 These depend on the domestic price, pi, the ad valorem export subsidy rate (with border 
price as denominator), si and the ad valorem equivalent import tariff rate in foreign markets, ti*. 
 
7. Exports: 
 Foreigners subaggregate home exports and foreign products with elasticity of 
substitution σi* (defined positive).  Their demand for product group i has elasticity -Ωi (where Ωi 
is also defined positive). 
Where 
and where θi is the calibrated reference share of the home export in total consumption.  Note 
that, when exports are small compared with foreign markets (θi is small), foreign demand for 
home product i has approximate elasticity -σi*, irrespective of foreigners' elasticity of demand 
for that product group.  Ei is also a calibrated constant. 
 Thus far, we have been able to solve directly for domestic and imported product prices, 
the volume of exports and unit factor demands.  Despite the simplifying dependence of this 
solution on an exchange rate and factor prices which are (at this stage) exogenous, solving for 
the other key variables which characterise the equilibrium involves unavoidable simultaneity.  
The additional relationships on which the simultaneous solution is based are those which follow. 
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8. Final demand: 
 Home consumers are assumed to subaggregate home goods and imports with elasticity of 
substitution σi.  They have Cobb-Douglas utility and hence expenditure shares across product 
groups are constant.  Final demand for home goods is therefore: 
Where ai is the calibrated reference expenditure share of product group i, δi is the corresponding 
share of home goods in final demand for group i and Y is aggregate income (GNP). 
 Similarly, final demand for imports is  
Note that, if imports dominate final demand (δi approaches zero), the price elasticity of final 
demand for home goods is approximately -σi.  If, on the other hand, home goods dominate the 
domestic market, the elasticity is approximately -1. 
 
9. Demand for inputs: 
 This is derived from the input-output coefficients and gross industry output, Q.  For 
home inputs of type j it is 
For the corresponding imported inputs it is 
10. Total imports: 
 This is simply the sum of final demand with intermediate demand for imported goods. 
i
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11. Gross industry output: 
 In matrix form, where Q=[qi], this is 
 
( ) [ ]1( 1.17)A Q I A D X−= − +  , 
where intermediate demand is implied through the inverse Leontief matrix. 
 
12. Economic profits or losses: 
 This is revenue derived from mark-ups over unit variable costs, less total fixed costs.  
For sector i it is 
Where ni is the number of firms, fiK is the fixed capital requirement per firm and fiL is the fixed 
skilled labour requirement per firm in sector i. 
 
13. National income (GNP): 
 This is the sum of payments to domestically owned factors, the home share of any profits 
or losses made, net income from tariffs and export subsidies and the net inflow of unrequited 
transfers, including financial aid. 
where B is the (exogenous) net inflow of aid, borrowings and other unrequited transfers, 
measured in foreign currency.  KD is that part of the capital stock which is domestically owned.  
It is also held constant.  By comparison, the measure of GDP referred to in the paper 
incorporates all income to capital but omits the transfer from abroad. 
D *
i i i(A1.16)      =  +            iM M I ∀  
K L
i i ii i 1ii(A1.18)      = (  - )  -  (r  +  )          ip Qv wn f fπ ∀   
K N N N
*D i i
D k i ik i i i
T i ik=1 i=1 i=1 i=1
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14. Total factor demands: 
 In the case of capital, which is infinitely elastic in supply at exogenous interest rate r, the 
capital stock, KT, is the value of capital demanded. 
 The demand for skilled labour is 
and that for the other factors is 
 
15. Calculating imbalances: 
 Once the above equations have been used to solve recursively for p*, p, pe, and X, and 
simultaneously for D, I, M, Q, π, Y, KT, and L, any imbalances in foreign payments and 
domestic factor markets can be calculated. 
 Inflows and outflows on the balance of payments are calculated in domestic currency.  
Inflows combine export earnings with net transfers, B (set as exogenous in foreign currency). 
Outflows are repatriated earnings on foreign owned capital, the pre-duty cost of imports and the 
cost of export subsidies.  The external imbalance is then 
K N N N
* i i
T k i ik i i i
i ik=1 i=1 i=1 i=1
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  e
inflows(A1.25)      =  - 1
outflows∆  
 The corresponding factor market imbalances follow directly from equations (A1.21) and 
(A1.22), above.  They are 
where Lk is the full domestic endowment of factor k.  These imbalances enter the algorithm by 
which the exchange rate and factor prices are adjusted in search of the no-entry general 
equilibrium. 
 
16. The solution algorithm 
 The objective is to calculate the vector [e,w], which we shall call ω, yielding a vector of 
imbalances ∆=[∆e,∆L] which is suitably close to 0.  A variant of Newton's Method is used.  
Extensive use is made of the above no-entry solution for given ω.  At the outset, a matrix of 
derivatives is calculated by imposing small shocks on ω and calculating the associated changes 
in ∆.   This matrix, H, has the following elements: 
where the superscript 0 indicates reference values and superscript 1 indicates those following s 
small shock to ω.  In any iteration m, 
But the objective is to choose the new values of ω, ωm, so that ∆m=0.  Imposing this yields 
*N N N
iD ii
T D ii i
T i ii=1 i=1 i=1
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Thus, the solution is derived by successive application of (A1.29) until ∆ is within a suitable 
tolerance of 0. 
 
The solution with firm entry and exit 
 Where firm entry and exit are allowed, a common closure requires that this take place to 
exhaust all economic profits.  The objective is then to calculate the vector n which yields 
π(n)=0.  The imbalance used in this case is the excess rate of return on capital. 
where Ki is the total demand for capital in sector i. 
 The algorithm used is very similar to that used in the no-entry solution to solve for ω.  A 
matrix of derivatives is approximated by first disturbing elements of the vector n slightly and 
using the complete no-entry solution to calculate the resulting changes in π, and hence in ∆n.  An 
adjustment rule identical to equation (A1.29) is then applied at each iteration, until ∆n is within a 
suitable tolerance of 0. 
 
The elasticity of demand facing domestic industries 
 The sources of demand for home products are final demand, intermediate demand and 
export demand.  For sector i, the elasticity sought is a composite of the elasticities of all three 
sources of demand. 
Where s here designates the volume share of the home product in each source of demand. 
 Beginning with final demand, differentiating (A1.12) yields 
m m-1 -1 m-1(A1.29)      =  (1 -  )Hω ω ∆   
in
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Where the share in parentheses is that of home goods in final demand for product group i.  Its 
value in the reference SAM is δi. 
 Turning then to export demand, differentiating (A1.11) yields 
Note that this is a weighted average of the elasticities -Ω and -σ*.  In the likely even that θi is 
small, the approximate value of this elasticity is -σi*. 
 Finally, turning to intermediate demand, we follow Harris (1984) in approximating this 
component elasticity on the assumption that gross sectoral output, Qj, is unaffected by the price 
of any individual input, i.  Analytical expressions for εiI, for the case in which this assumption is 
relaxed, are available on request from the authors.  These lengthy expressions have not been 
used in the current version. 
  From (A1.14) 
Then, expanding Aij using (A1.8) and (A1.3), we obtain the derivative and elasticity: 
Where sijI is the share of industry j in the total intermediate demand for input i.  These 
component elasticities are assembled using (A1.32).  In the solution to the model this is done in 
such a way as to ensure that all the shares, siF, siI, siX and sijI are up-dated at each iteration. 
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